Kate Al,ramson a i Adnnl Lcitc 6 Is 3. 4. At least, this is true in the usual, rccognizably pathological cases of selfhatred. To calf such a fcatlre of charactcr a ntordl flaw is not yet to call it blameworthy. The proPer form of rcsponsc may bc something in quitc a-differcnt register from blame or rcproach. llere wc are working with a broad concep_ ti;n of thc moral on which traits arc ethically evaluable insofar as they make a percon well or ill-suited for (pafiicular) spheres of interpersonal intetaction (Abrarnson 2008; Abramson & Leite 201l.) It Better to Love Better Things? Aaron Smuts 1 Introduction Is it better to love better things? This question is ambiguous in multiple ways. There are at least three variables: (a) What kind ot betur do we have in mind? Prudential, moral, aesthetic, or some other kind of bette., such as more meaningful? (b) What do we mean by love? Do we simply mean'l iking,'or are we asking about something more robnst, such as care or romantic love? (c) What kinds of tltirrgs are we talking about? Ideals, artifacts, places, pets, or people? From these three variables and the limited lists of suggested options we can generate the following equation: 4 kinds of better x 3 kinds of love x 5 kinds of obiects = 60 different questions. And we should probably consider the second 'better'as a fourth variable, making matters more complex. Perhaps the answers are different for every question. It seems clearly better to care about ideals in proportion to their importance. But when it comes to people/ the situation is not so straightforward. For example, it is far from clear that parents should love their children in proportion to their rnerits. It's not possible to address all these different questions here. To keep the scope manageable, we need to reform the general question into somethinS more specific. I will make two of the variables concrcte, the kind of love and the kind of obiect. Here I intend to answer the question 'ls it better to love (in a robust sense that I will explain) better people?'I wil l try to get clear about the kind of better at issue as we proceed. Truth be told, I won't be offering a fully satisfactory answer to the question. I wil l try to get a l itt le clearer about the ways it might be better to love better people. And I wil l attempt to show how this.claim is compatible with the 'Do-reasons' view of love the view that l!,ve 5. ln Jamie's case, there is in fact a 'thcre tllcrc' there ale proiects, interests, desircs that arc Jamic's own but hcr rcfusal to punue thcm, out of disl ikc for herself, gives thc appcarancc to anyone trying to love her that this i'5 not the casc. This distinguishcs Jamic's case from, for instance, cases in which the beloved is attempting to livc vicariously through the lovet's own intercsts, Droiects, and desires. Bibliography Abramson. K. & l ,eite, A. (2011)' l-ove as a l{cactivc Emotion, ' lD'r i losol l l i 'dl Quatte y, 6'l (245), 673-99. Abramson, K. (2010) 'A Scntimcntal ist 's Dcfensc of ( lontcmpt, Shame & Disdain, ' in Ttrc Oxfotd Hatltllxtok to the Entotiotts, ed. Peter Goldie (Oxford: Oxford Univcrsity Prcss), 1 88-21 3. - (ZOdg)'sympathy and llume's Spectator-Ccntcrcd Theory of Virtue,'in A Comttarlion to Hutrte, ed. E. Radcliffc (Malden: Illackwell Publishing), 240-56' Darwall. S. (1977) ''lwo kinds of Respect,' gt rir.t. 88 (l)' 36-49. Frankfuft, H. (2004) 'The Dear Sclf,' in Trtc Redsots of Love (Princcton, NJ: Princeton Univenitv Press). Harcourt, [,. (2009) 'Selfl-ove and Practical Rationalitt' in C' Bagnoli (ed') Morality and the EnotiorJ (Oxford: Oxford Univcrsity Prcss). Strawson, P t. (1974) '!'ree&)m and Rcsentn)ent,' in F/eedotn atkl Rcsetttntent a d Oflrer tssnys (Ncw York Routledge). Vellcman. D. (1999) ' l ,ovc as a Moral l imotion, ' Et lr i .s, 109 (2), 33&74' - (2008) 'Beyond Price,' Etlritr, 1ltl, 191-212. 9 l t <r2 , lnnnt s t I t l5 ca l rno t l ) c i us l i l i cd . I n sho r t , t l l e r easo l l s i l i s l ) c t l e r t o l ovc be t t e r peo l ) l c i l r c no t l l l c k i r ) ds o f r casons l ha l ca t l i ( l s l i l y l ovc . 2 'l'hc naturc of love I i n l ( ' l r ( 1 l { ) r t ' s l r i c t t he d i scuss io l l l o l ovc o f l ) f r so l l s , b t l l t l l i s i s so l r l c w l ra l l ) r o l ) l c l t i c . l fwc igno rc i r l l x ) r t a l l t i t l s l a t l c cso l l ove ,wew i l l l i ke l y cult ivi l tc a dclornted l l reory rcared ot l at l i l l ] l )alal lced diet of exalnples f l r i s i s l ) r cc i sc l v w l l a t we f i t l d i t l l l l c l i t c ra t l l r c . Ma t t y P l t i l osop l t c r s a re corrrf trrtablc dcnying t l lat wc catl lovc al l i t l lals. I l t l t t l l is scelns l)rel)osl c ro r r s l o a l l l )U t t l l o se she l l e r i t lS so lnc l ) c l l l l co r ) ' o l l ove Peop le ca rc i o r I l r c i r I ) c l s , s l ) e r1d l ) t t ge an lo ( t l t l s o I l ] l ( ) l l ( ' y ( n l t l l c t r l , a l l d g r i cve w l l e l l t l r c y d i c . l ' l i ) ( l cny t ha t someo t te g r i cv i t t g f o r ( l l c i r dead ca t l oves t l l c i r l ) c l i s W i l ( l l y cou r t c r i n t l t i t i ve a t l d l l o r r i l ) l y i l l se t l s i l i v c . l l iol t l ]osc lr()t l ) l i kered bv a beni8l l tc( l t l lcoly, i t is easy to see t l lat l ()vt ' fol pc'r 'sorts ancl Iot pets is of t l )e sanle gel leral ki l ld. ' fhcy pass t l le ioke tesl f o r syn ( ) r y l l r y . ' l l l e r c i s no th i l t g f t l t t t l y i l l ) o t l t l l l i s scn t c t l ce : ' l l o vc l ny w i l c an ( l l ny c l r i l ( l r I ) o re t l l an a t t y th i t r g . ' No l i s l l l c r c a l l y t l l i ng f { l n l l y a l x ) r r t l l r i s scn l cn (c : ' l l e l o re s l l e had l t c r l i r s l c l l i l ( 1 , s l l c l ovcd l l e r ca t l r l o r c l l l a l l i | l r v t l r i l l g . ' I l u t t l l e re i s so rne t l t i t t g I r t t t t t y g t l i t t g o l l l l c r c : 'Bek ) re I l nc t n l y wile, I lovct l [r iccl cft ickert nrore tharr anvtl l i l tS. 'r Tl le Iast sentel lce fai ls thc iokc lcsl. l l is f l tnny. The ioke test rtveals al l equivocatiol l l l rat sl lows us \orlcl lr ing irnportatrt about love. l l lc sct l lct lcc equivocalcs ol l ' love. ' l l rc kin(l ol love t l lal ol le feels Ior oltc 's wifc is l lot at al l l ike what ot le r r ca r r s u ' l r c r t onc savs ' l l ove f r i ed c l t i c kc t l . 'W l t c t l Pcop le say l l l a t t l l c v lovc lr ic( l clr ickerl , thcy mcrely nrearl l l rat t l ley I ikc i t a lot. Btl t this is r lol wl lal l l ley nlcan wllel l t l ley say that t l )cy lovc l l leir cats. f lel lce, t l lc kir l( l of l ()vc at issuc is r lot l l lefely l l le lovc () l lx 'rs() l ls l l is broa(ler ' l l rsl l row to sct l l le bout]daries, t l louSll , is lar lr(nrl obvious. Sol l le pcol) lc rel l ly ( j() secrl lo love t l leir cars. Atl( l l l ) is ( locs l lot appear lo be a tr lelal) lr()r. ()ne srggestiott that t l l iSht l lelP r ls ( l ist i l lAl l is l l loving from l iki l lS 0 lol is I l r is: we ca| only love wltat wc l tcrccive to l lave a 8ood. Tl l is docs l lot (()nlnl i t rrs to slving t l lat cars l lave wellare. Most plausibl) ' , only sel l t iet l l crcalurcs l()r wl lotr l thi trgs t l lat ler l l : lve !( ' l [are i l l a l lon_metapl]()r ical scnsc. l lul () l l lcr t l r i r l ls, suclt as l) lat l ls att( l cars, t lol l-rncta pl lor ical ly have ,l(nxl\ . I 'cr l)al)s l l rcse are best ( lescri l)c( l i t r l )cr lccl i() t l is l tcr l l ls. l t is tr l lc lear' Irr nY casc, l l l t l lat t y suggestiorl rcql l i res is l l l l l l l !c lovcr see t l le beloved as lravirrg a goori. | ( l i ( l l lot say l l lat I l rc lovcr r l l l lst l )e l iSl l l . l ' l l is Perccpl iorr i s i n r l n ) r l a l r t l ) c caUse i t l o rde r l i ) r a l l a l l i l t l ( l c t o l ) e I ove i t t r us t i l l vo l vc a on-scl li l | lc lcstcd conceri] fbr the l)elov((1. ' l i ) l ) t l l i l l l lore precisely, ol lc nrusl, I l lc lst i l r parl , care for lhe bclove(l Iot l tcr owtt sake.r Is It ll.ft( k, Lot\' lldto Tltitrcs? 9:l 2.1 Love the attitude and loving relationships A frrrther poilrt of clarif icatior) is i lr order: we must l lc carclit l lo distlt)- $rish the attitude, or wllat we rniglrt somewhat rrislcadingly call ' love the feeling,' frorn lovinll relationships. It seems perfectly colterent to think that sonleone could love another from a distance, or tr)erely in absence of a ronrartic relationship. One of t l le cold hard tacts ot l i fe is that mttch love goes ullrequited. Hence, Iove sollgs. Givell t l)e lnere possibil i ty of urrrequiled love, we can be certain that t l le ro|rrantic love that a lover feels for l l is beloved is different from al)y ronlall l ic relationship tl lat might exist betweerl the two. This is clear. However, the diflcrcrtce between the attitude and the relationship is nore diff icrrlt to see when it cornes to friendship. In English we lack a sDecific word for the alti l udc t l lal one has toward friends. We lalk of eros and romar)tic love, l)ul nol friendros and friendly love. All we llave is a word denot ing thc rc la ( ions l r ip , f r i cndsh i l t . I suspec t l l l a t t l r i s i s l i ke ly because the feelirrgs involvcd in friendslrips are Inore subdued than tllose in eros. ReSardless, on further reflection it is clear tl lat (he love one feels for a friend is also distinct from the relationshiD. distinct from the friendship.s One can contil lue to care for a friend after Itavitrg nroved far away. Although you cannot have a genuine friendship without the atti lude, the attitude carr persist after the relationsll ip is over. lt can evcn persist after the friend dies. Hence, the attitude and the relationship (the friendship) are not t l lc sarne. To put things togctlrer: Wllen I ask'ls better to love bettcr lhings?'I want to know if i l is better to love (to have an attitude tl lat essentially involves a conccrn for the bcloved for her own sake direcled al) better people. The revised versiorr ol t l le opening question is sti l l antbiguous. By asking'ls it bettcr to lovc better people?'we rnigllt sirnply be looking lbr ways in wl)ich it is better to love some people rather than otlters. Clearly it is better for rne to love those who rnake rne l lappy. Tltat's not at all controversial. Flence, I don't think that's all sofireoDe rnight be after when they ask such a qucstion. Instead, they l ikely want to know if t ltere are reasoDs irr favor of loving someone or another. Tll is coltcern is captured by a sligllt ly revised version of the question, 'What reasoDs are there to love better people?' 3 Evaluating attitudes Irt the philosophical l i tcratrrre on attitudes, the iustif icalion of belief has received far rDore attcllt ion than that of care, love, or t l le elnotions. I r),1 Adrotr S,rtuts w i l l P r l r sue t he i ssu€ f r o r I l t c l l e r spec t i ve o f I l l c l ) l l i l o so l ) l l y o l e l l l o t i o l l , ! v l r i l e pay ing a t t en t i o l t t o t l l e l ) r ob le l l r o I I t r ck t l ] a l l l a s occ t l l ) i ed ep i s te rI |ologists lbr t l re past 50 years. One of the most prol l l i l let l t col lcerns of l) l l i l ()sol) l lcrs o[ elnotiot l i5 w l l e th€ r s tanda rd e r r l o t i o t l s ad tu i l o f r a t i o l l n l i ( t s l i l i ca l i o l l . T l l i s i s sue i s o l t cn sa id t o i nvo l vc t hc ra t i o l l a l i l y o f l hc c t r r o l i ( ) r l s . B t r t w l l a t PeoP lc rnca r ) l ) y ' t hc ra t i e l l a l i t y o l c t no l i o t t ' va r i cs r i l ( l i ca l l y . Wc c i l l l d i sce rn a t l cas t f i ve d i f f e re r l t s t a l l da r ( l s l i ) r evn l t l n l i l l l l l l l ( ' I ' r l i ( ' r l r l i l \ , r l l r r ' " l i o r r i t l r c sponses . We m iS l l l wo l )d ( ' r i l r l l ( ' r r r l r l r " r r cv i deDcc . A l t en ra l i v f l \ , t \ r ' r l r l ' l l r l ' " r cn ro t i on i s r r l t t . Fo r s ta l l da f ( l e l l l ( ) l i , ' r l \ . l l l ! ' t l l c i r eva lua t i onS a rc Co r rec l . ( ) r t \ r ' r t r i . l , i , 1 ' o fane tno t i on i s / r o l r o r t i ( r k l l l o i l so l ) i c c t - ( ) r n1 r ) l i ! l r l , r . l . r r l l r ' ' t l r ) l l was i f f one ' s l onSte r l n l r 6 t i t t ! r r s l . F i t l a l l y , i v c l ) l iS l r t t r ) l ( ) u r r , l ! \ l a r rd wllv sotneone would react t l lat way. l l so, i l wc ci l l l r l l l ( lerstal ld 1^' l) \ t l ley reacled as t lrey did, lhc erl lot iorr is i t t tLI l iSihlc. " A l l o f t hese s tanda rds a re i l l l e res l i r lS , a l l d wc co t l l d cc r l a i r l l y n ( l d t o t l l e l i s l . Bu t I wan t t o f oc t l s o t l i t l s t onc o f t l l c i l hovc , l l l a l o l ap lness w l l e t l r e r t he emo t i o r l i s a l ) l ) r o l ) r i a te t o l l l e l ca l t l r ( ' s o l i l s ob iec l . Th i s s tanda rd i s mos t i l t l po r t a t l t i l l t l l e l i t e ra t t l r c o l l l ( ) vc . T l l c ques t i o l l o f w l )e thc r we can i us t i f y l ovc i s p r i l na r i l y a q t l es t i o t l a l ) o ( t t t l l c ap l ) r o l l r i aleness of the att i tude to i ts ol) iect, the belove(|. Wllel l w€ ask wllet l ler love can be iust i f ied, we watl l lo kr low if t l lcrc irc l lor lnativ€ rcasons l l lat could make t l le lovc ol solne obiects npprol)r i i l lc al ld ol l lers i l l lpp rop r i a te . As I r nake c l ca r i l ) t l l c l l ex t sec l i o l l , i t l s l i l y i l lS l ( ) \ ' ( r t qu i r ( s show ing t ha t t he a t l i l t t de i s r esPo t l s i vc t o t l l ese k i t l ( l s ( ) l r easo t l s . 3,1 Motivating reasons, normative reasoDs, and luck l l i s i n r l , o r t an t t o n l akc i l ( l i s l i nc t i o l l be l r { qe l l l l l ( ) l i va l i r t g a t l r l t r . r r n ta t i v c (o r i us t i f y i ng ) r easo t l s . l v l o t i va t i l l g r easo l l s n r c l x ' s l l l l ( J t r s l r ' l a \ a sl)ecie5 of exPlanatory reasotls. I l l tcr lns of act i()r ls, l l l () l ival l l l t !r ' i tsot ls explain why we act. A rnol ivat i t lS reasol l is t l lc cf l icacior.rs l l lot ive ot aI l acl ion. As the famil iar cottrtrootn dranla nlakcs clcar, a gt l i l ty verdict is n ro re l i k c l v t o be sec t l r cd i f l l l e r c i s a c l ea r t l l ( ) l i v c l i ) r l l l ( ' c r i l nc . W l l e r l wc t r y t o ncco { rn t f o r a k i l l c t ' s l l l ( ) l i ve , we i r c t r v i l lS l o ( l ( ' s ( r i l ) c l l i s r n { r f i va l i l l g r easons . Wc a rc l r y i ns l o exp la i t l , l l o l i l l s l i l y t l l ( c r i l r l c R t r I son rc t i r ncs , n l o t i va t i r ) g r caso r l s ca l l a l so l ) e i us l i t v i l lS , r e i l s ( ) l l s . l i ) r i r l s l a t l ce , i f solI lcone cracks a ral) ist 's ( lot l lc 14' i t l l a Brooklvl l ( :r t lsl lcr i l l ordcr t() sk)p a v i o l en t r ape , t he v i c t i l l l ' s s t l f f c r i l l g I nos t P la t l s i l ) l v i r l s l i l i e s t l l c i t l t c r ven t i o r . Thc mo t i va t i l lE a l l d i t l s t i f y i l l s r easo l l s a r c l l l c sa l l l c , o r a t l eas t close enough. Wherl i t cot l lcs to actions, l lornlat ivc rcasol ls are thosc ls ll llt'ttut tu Lov( It(trr,/ 7llill j' 95 that cour)t i11 Iavor oI a course oI actior. Sloppinll undeserved suflcring is a good reas()n lo acl. But it is inlportant to note that t l!e rrerc presence of normalive reasons does rrot alwavs iusli ly an action.'I l l is is lrccause we are sornelirrcs unaware of t l le nornrntive reasons tl ler! ' Ini!{l)t be to act. A lanatical terrorist with a prcssure cooker bonll) lni8ht l)e standing in front of us at a crowded evcr)1. If so, we surely have good reason to smasll t lre terrorist in the back ol thc lrcad wil lr a brick bclorc an explosion is triggercd. It lrt i f wc do no t k r )ow l l la t the person i r l ron t o f us i s a te r ro r is t , t l r i s reaso l l is not availall le lo us. lf, ignorant of thc fact, we nevertheless dccide to crack tl le l)crson's skull for wearing an ugly sll irt, the unavailall le normalivc rcasor) could not irrstifv orrr aclion. It is certainly rot okay to sr ack sonlcone for \4'earil lg an rrgly sll irt. Tl)is reveals sornctl l inl l important abolrl nornlative reasons: in order to iustify arl action, thc normalive rcasons nrust feature prorninently in the set of motivatirg rcasons tbr l lre action. lf t l le person we srnacked for wearing an ugly sh i r t tu rne( l ou l lo be a te r ro r is t , th is wou l ( i be a happy acc idcn l . l l l r t the unknown fac t t l l a t l l e was a te r ro r is l wou ld no t j t ' s t i f y lay i rg l r i | | l out for l l is lack ol goocl fashion serlse. l lapl)y accidents do lrol a[rourll to ius t i f i ca t ions . Tlrere is no reason to think tl lal t l le situation is any different wllerl i t comes to ius t i f y ing a t t i tudes and o thsr r to r ) -ac t ions . A l though lhere are not (straigl)tforward) motivati g rcasons for attitudes, l l lcre are cxplanatory reasorrs. They give us tlrc ctiolol{.v of the attitude. ln order for an attitudc to be justif ied in the scnse al issue here, thc ctiology rnust l)rornincrtly include thc justifyinll reasons. l l t l lere wcre nor[rativc reasons for lraving arr attitude, l:rul t lrc reasons did nol featurc in the exp la t ]a l io r ) o f lhe a t t i tude , t l re p rescrce o f l l l e normat ive reasons would Inerely l)e a happy accident. -fo put it ar)other wa-y, ar) ail i tude is a happy acci(lc|lt in relation to sorne nonDative reason unless tlre attitude is a response to that normalive reason. A iustif ication lor an attitude rr|usl show ll lat t lre attitude is a response to normative reasons, Dot mcrely tl lal sorre such reasons erisl. 4 Justifyin!{ love Tlrere are two colrl l)ctir8 scl)ools ol l l l()ugllt on tlre issue oI wllctlrcl love can be justif i( 'd: t l le no-reasons vicw ard l lre reasons view. 'f l le no-reasons vicw is iust as it sounds. It lrol(ls l l lat love canrrot l)e iusli l ied or, to put it sonlcwhat arntriguouslv, that lhere are no iustifying reasons for love. A no-reasons view holds o|]e o[ lwo clains: (a) there arc |lo I 96 Aaron Smuts normative reasons for love, or (b) the attitude is not responsive to whatever putative normative reasons tl lere night be. In coDtrast, the reasons view holds that love can be iustif ied. Justifying love requires showinS both that there are normative reasons for love and that the attitude is responsive to these reasons at the appropriate stage in its life cycle. This is no place to defend the no-reasons view, but I witl sketch some support. The no-reasons view is supported by three types of considerations: love's apparent lack of reasons responsiveness, the failure of the opposition to provide a plausible alternative, and the lack of any clear account of how love could be justif ied in principle. Our literary ftadition from Sappho to Shakespeare provides support for the claim that love is not an obiective assessment of the beloved. To take an extreme and somewhat offensive example, Lucretius sees love as a delusion: The black girl is brown sugar. A slob that doesn't bathe or clean / Is a Nahtrctl leauty; Athena if her eyes are greyish-green. / A stringy beenpole's a gazelle. A midget is a .tprite , I Cutc as 4 buxofi. She's a knockout if she's a Siant's height. / The speech-impaired has a charming lithp; if she can't talk at all / She's sft,'. The shary-tongued shrew is spankl, a little lircbatt. / If she's too skin-and-bones to live, she's a slip of a girl, if she / ls sicklt she's just delicatc, though half dead from TB. / obese, with massive breasts? a Noddcss of fertility! / Snub-nosed is pert, lat l ips are pouts beSSing to be kissed - / And other delusions of this kind are too numerous to list. (Lucretius ZOO7 , IV, p 142, ln. 1760-70) We need not think that love essentially involves error. Lucretius goes much too far. Nevertheless, love does not seem to follow from any obiective appraisal. Love rides over and above any assessment of the beloved (Singer 1966). We can work at trying to love someone, but it seems to iust happen or not. No matter how good we think that someone is, we may or may not love them. Love, at least to some degree, iust does seem to be a matter of chemistry. And chemistry is not responsive to reasons. The no-reasons view also Sains support from the failure of the competition. Any attempt to appeal to the properties of the beloved runs into the problem of trading upi if what iustified your stafiing to love X were X's good features, then if Y has a Sreater degree of the same features, it seems that you should trade up. How could your continuing to love X be iustified in the face of Y? But this is absurd. The obiects of our love are not fungible. They are irreplaceable individuals.T Love that accepts Is It Bettar to Love Better Thin$? 97 substitutes is not worthy of the name. Alternative approaches appeal to the value of the relationship rather than the properties of the beloved. But relationship accounts do not fare much better. They also imply that one should trade up, not when the beloved is better, but when there is the promise of an even better relationship. These are but the opening moves in the debate. It is out of scope to pursue the issue further. For our purposes, the third source of support for the no-reasons view is most important. 4.1 Love and emotion There is excellent reason to think that love is not an emotion. At least, it is not an emotion according to the only theory of the emotions on which it makes sense to talk about iustif ication. This is imDortant because the reasons love is not an emotion also show that love cannot be assessed as appropriate or inappropriate. If one assumes that emotions are irrational bodily states, it makes l itt le sense to evaluate them in terms of appropriateness. Hun€ier can be €iood or bad for us, but it can't be inappropriate. If the emotions are akin to hunget there is no sense in trying to iustify them. The only theory of the emotions that clearly allows for robust rational iustif ication is also one of the most popular the cognitive theory. But love is not an emotion according to the cognitive theory. According to the cognitive theort emotions are obiect-directed attitudes that essentially involve evaluations.8 According to this view emotions are not mere feelings or physiological reactions. Instead, they require an evaluation of a situation, whether the evaluation be a iudgment or a way of seeing, a construal. The obiect-directed character of standard emotions is apparent in that it always makes sense to say of someone'lpick your emotion] that. ' I fear that a Rhode Island driver wil l crash into me when I'm out for run. I hope that I wil l make it home safely. I'm angry that yet arlother driver ran a stop sign as I was running through the intersection. Defenders of the cognitive theory typically distinguish between ernotions and mere moods, such as being grumpy, cheerful, or simply in a good mood. Moods do not take obiects, at least not specific objects. One is not grumpy that such and such. Rather, one is just grumpy. One might be grurnpt/ because of a hangover. But one is not grumpy r|f the hangover. Nor is one grumpy that one is hung over. Although someone might be ashamed of being once again unable to resist the siren call of bourbon, this is not the obiect of the grumpiness. At most, it is the mere cause. Shame is an emotion; grumpiness ii a mood. 9lJ Adrrr J,rr l Is ' l l l c re a re t l l r c c exce l l e l l t r easons t o t h i l l k t l l i r t i f t l l e cog l ) i t i ve t l l eo ry i s r i g l r t t he r l l ove i s l l o l a l l e rno t i o r l F i r s t , i l l co l l t r as t t o s ta t l d i r d cn ro t i o l r s , l ove i s l l o t cp i sod i c as a re a l l s l a l ) da r ( l e l no t i o l l s t l l l l i ke pa ra d ig r ! r a t i c e r t o t i o t l s suc l l as l ea r , s l l a t r ] c , a l l d a l l gc r , l ovc does l l o t P rcse r l t i t ictf i rr cl iscrerc episodes strre, yor.r tnay wcl l up wllen reunitc( l wi l l r son)eone yol l lovc, ot t)urst i l l lo tears r 'vht ' l t 1'ott l lapPily discovcr that yorrr l)cloved avertcd disaster, bt l t t l lcse lcel ir tg are best dcscribed as episoclc's of tr lr l i f t , l )appit less, arld l l re l ike, t lot love Tltet l agair l ' perhaPs one ( ioes sol l lel i l r les fcel lovc actl tcly. l l t l t even wllel l ol le isl l ' t feel ir ls w l ra tevc r i t i s t l l l t we t l l i ! t k o f as t l l c f ee l i l l g o f l ove , o t re s t i l l l o vcs A l)arenl doesl l ' t slol) lovit lS t lreir chi ld \ ' \4rel l t l ley are driving to work' f r us r ra l cc l by t r a f f i c co t lScs t i o t r . No . ' l l l e i r l ove re t r t a i ns l l c l l ce ' r a t l l e r t l r a r ) ep i sod i c l ove a l ) pea rs t o bc d i sPos i t i ona l ' r I t i s wha t A lexande r S t rand ca l l s a se r r t i t nen t ( 1914 ) . Second , a l l l l ough i t i s p l aus ib l e l ha l we ca l t sone t imcs f ce l l ovc a r l d no t j us t t t l e e l no t i ons i t g i ves r i se 1o , t l l e i n rPo r tan t t l r i nS t o rea l i ze is { l lat our errot iol l t dc'pct ld on our col lccrt ls. l 'hey dcpellcl ot l wnat we care about. [ , lnotiol]s rcqtt irc t l lat !re care about t l lat wl l icl l was or s ta rds t o be a l f cc ted . " ns note(l al)ovc, slal ldard el l lot iol ls take obiectsTl lcy esscl l t ial ly i nvo l vc a t l eva lua t i o l l o f a r r ob lec l , o r wha t we ca l l t l l e ' f o rma l ob iec t ' ' lhc lonnal obi i- 'ct i5 t l le ol) iect ut ldcr solr le dcscriPtiot l We attr i t)ute sonle tealure to t l)e ol) iect, such as dal lgerousrless to a snarl i l l ! , do8's l o t l g , s l l a rp t ce th . A r l eva lua t i o l l t l l a l l l t e l o l l g , s l l a rP t cc t l l a r c da l lSc ro t t s ci l(scs thc pl lysiological resPollscs cl laracterist ic oI fear' TlIe eval l lat i on no t o t t l y has a f o r t na l ob iec l , i t l ] as a f ocus The tee th a re no t j us t da gerous i l l Pri l lc iPle Tht 'y are thfeatcnir lg Morc precisely' they { l l r ca tenso l l l e t l l i l l S tha twcca rea l l o t r t t r a l l r e l y , ou Ia r t l l s Wewou ldn ' t l 'ecl fear i f t l te teeth t l l reatened t l le destr( lct iol l ol a chew toy l f we cal l love alr errtot iol l , we losc r l)e explat latory l)ower of t l le priori ty of cares ovcl emotiolrs. l t would bccotJlc hard to Inake sense ol t l le i l l terconnectedness oI our en]ot iol lal l ives. T l l e t l l i r d r . ' ason t o t h i nk t ha t l ove i s no t an emo t i o l l acco rd i l l g t o t l ) e col l l l i t ive t l teory is t l )e nrost import i l l ) t for ol lr pt lrposes tJr l l ike startdard e rDo t i ons , t l l c re i s l l o c l ea r eva lua t i o l l i t t vo l ved t l l a t l l e l ps i l l d i v i dua te lovc from othcr sl)ccies ol affect. According to lhe cogl l i t ive thcory' s tan . l a rd e l l l o l i o l l s l l o t on l y csse l l t i a l l y i l l vo l vc eva lua t i ons bu t l l l e eva lua t i o l t s a r c l l l e p r i t l c i l ) a l I t t eans l r y u ' l l i ch wc d i s t i l lSu i sh en to t i ons fronl orle anothcr. Consider feal attd attger, ioy ancl pride, el l ly and iealousy, at ld sltatt le at ld enlbarrassulclt t : cacl l pair fccls sinri lar ' There is lrardly arry tel l i r lg thern aPart mcrely frorn the way t l ley leel Bttt the ls It Rctt?r to Lofc Bctter Tlti ss? 99 kind of evaluations they involve differ. For an emotion to be atrget you rnust judge that someone has wronged you or yours. ln contrast, for an emotion to be that of fear, yor.r rnust iudge that sonething you care about is in danger. The problerr for those who claim tlrat love is an enrotion is that tf iere is no plausible evaluation that is necessary for love.rr The only viable candidate seems to be that the object is lovable. But this is l lopeless. lt is circular and erlt irely uninforrnative. .Just what is it to judge an object to be lovable? There are no other good candidates. For instance, to judge that the beloved is irreplaceatrle to you is simply to recognize that you love it. Hence, it can't be the evahlation responsible for your love. The moral of the story is that since there is no clear candidate evaluation that is necessarv for love. it is unclear how love could be assessed tbr cvaluativc correctness. What evaluation should be checked, exactly? In I l lc next section, I sl low how the disinterested nature of love nakes this problem more pronounced. It has important implications for the kinds of reasons that ottrers have appealed to. 5 Prudential, epistemic, and meaningful reasons So far I have said a bit about the nature of love and the nature of justif ication. Without assuming the no-reasons view, I wil l show that the kinds of consideratiorrs that one finds in the l iterature are rrot the kinds of reasons that could ever justify love. Accordingly, there is no problem lor the no-reasons view here. Harry Frankfurt argues that the principal reason one has to love is selfinterest. Since love is so important for l iving a good life, he argues that l l le nost important consideration when we are thinking about what we rlroulrl love is simply whether we can love it, not whether it is worthy. I lrI valrrc of t l le obiect is of l i tt le interest. He asks of the Final Sohrtion: '\\r lr it r( irsolr would he [Hitler] have, after all, to care about something llrni nrakes no irnportant difference to hirn?'(Frankfurt 2002, p.248). lfankfurt obviously thinks that caring (or loving) is good for us. It is goocl for us to love. Why he thinks this is less evident. As far as I can tell, lre thinks that loving makes our l ives fulf i l l ing. It does this by helping to prevent apathetic suffering and boredom. This is l ikely right. It probably is indeed good for us to love. And it is probably prudentially better to love what is better at makinS us happy. But these kinds of considerations are incapable of iustifying any given instance of love. In fact, they appear to be entirely the wrong kind of reasons that one can offer in favor of loving a particular individr.lal. At best, they can justify loving in general. 1O0 ,4dro,r.!t/ttJ We are looking for reasons in support of particular instances ol love: 'What norrnative reasorls tniSht there be to love X?' We are not looking for a general iustif icalion of loving. In the closely related l iterature oo whetlrer partiality (to famil, fr iends, race, ethnicily, or nation) is ever permissible, many are content witlt a Seneral defense ol simply being Partial lf we were not partial to our friends and family, our lives wotrld srrf{er. The goods of close personal relationships would be lost. Hence, it seenls partialitv is irr general iustif ied.'2 Here we need not worry whether tl l is style ol argttment succeeds. I merely note it to show that it simply does not address l lr( ' issue at hand. We do not want to know wllether it is Sood lo love; we want to know if we can iustify our love of specific individuals. It is crucial to see that the putative pnrdential value of lovil lg (in general) cannot provide a iustif icatioll for lovirtg sonle spccil i( l)ersorl. The srggestion that one's love fbr X is it lstif ied because it is Sood tor otre to love X, or because it is better for orre to love X than Y fails. It fails because love requires non-self-interested concerl). And one catlnot, orl pain of incoherence, love another non-self-intercsledly because doitlg so benefits oneself. The same holds for indirect fornts of benefit, say, through tl le value oI a relationship. Orle callnot carc lor anotller for her sake for one's own sake. Rentenrber, for a teasott to iustify an atti lude, the attitude must be resDonsive to tlre reasorl. If t l le reason is sclf-interest. the attitude cannot be respolrsivc to tl l is reasoll and be l lotl-selfinterested.r3 Hence, self-interest canrlot it lstify any partictl lar occurrence of love. At best it can iustify lovirlS i lr $cneral, bcil lE opeo to love, or what we lnight call the institution of lovitrg. Frankfurt recoSnizes i l)at there is a 'certailr incorlsistency' l lere. He says: The apparent contl ict between selflessness arld self-irtterest disal)pea rs once it is understood that what serves the self-i lrterest of thc lover is, precisely, his selflessness. The benefit of loving accrues to him only if he is genuinely selfless. (1999, p. 174) But this doesn't solve the problem. lt worr't just t l isappear irt a puff of smoke after a bit of hand-wavin8. The fact t l)at t l le bcrlefit catl accrrte only if the lover is selfless lrows that the reasolls of self-interesl cannot iustify love. One call ' t be responsive to reasons of self-interest alld be selfless. In fact, Frankftlrt has Siven us a perfect statement of a l lapPy accident. Although it is not inconsistetlt to tl l ink that one could benefit from selflessness, it is incoherent lo tl l ink that self-i l l terest could iusti ly one's selnessness. Is It Rctfer to Lov? Bcftar Thitlrs? 7O1 Tl)e same considerations hold for the reasons of truthfulness and the reasons of meaningfulness, reasons that Srrsarr Wolf proposes i l) response to Frankfrrrt (Wolf 2002). One cannot love another for her own sake for the sake of truth or for the sake of making one's l i fe more rneaningful. That's incoherent. A defender of the no-reasons view could grant that it is prudentially, trutl l lul ly, and meaningfully better to love better people but sti l l hold, without any kind of tension, that love cannot be rationally iustif ied. 6 What's wrong with loving Hitler? Although reasons of prudence, truthfulness, and meaning cannot iustify love, there sti l l seems to be something to the claim that it is better to love better people. lt seems tlrat some people are indeed more lovable than others, and that some people are iust not worthy of love. This seems to be a silnple matter of evaluative correctness. Wolf argues that t l)ree lactors are relevant when evaluating love: the worth of the beloved, the Iover's affinity for the beloved, and the instrunrental value of t l le relationship. She develops her view with an array of examples that concern obiects and activit ies: types of music, watermelon-seed spitt ing, rubber-band collecti ltg, and the l ike. A similar set of examples is featured in her work on the Ineaning of l i fe (Wolf 2002, 2010a). It is plausible to say that one is iustif ied in preferring rock music to classical music by appeal to alf inity and instrurnental value, regardless of any possible differences in the wortl l of t l le two types of music. But the tlreory sits more uncomfortably wllen it comes to people. An athletic father of two might have a greater affinity for his sporty child with whorn he wil l certainly l lave more fun at the park. We can assume that the two children are of equal wortl l, but by Wolf's theory this doesn't mean that the father should love both equally. Since he has a Sreater affinity for the athletic son, and (let's assume) their t ime together wil l be more instrumentally valuable, her theory implies that he should love tlre athletic child more. That's not a nice imDlication. Perhaps our reactiolr to this exalnple rcflects a quirk of parenlal love. Maybe we have a deep commitment to a view of unconditional parental love. Perhaps we tllink of it as a form of agape, the bestowal of love regardless of the worth of the obiect. Regardless, the situation seems differellt when it comes to romantic love. As Wolf notes, it seems that some people are indeed rnore lovable than others and it would be better to love them than less worthy individuals. How should we make.sense of this? t lllz Aorcn Snluts lf love essentially involves an evaluation, we could easily make sense of this intuit ion. But there is no good candidate. As Doted earliet the only plausible candidate is that t lre object is lovable. This is not sufficient, since we might t l l ink that people are lovable yet not love them. llut it might be necessary. If we had a better l)andle on what makes someone obiectivelv lovable, we could evaluate love in ternrs of evaluative correctness. It would be inappropriate to love tl lose who are not lovable. The problern, once again, is that there is no content to tlre notion of what it is to be lovable. At best, it is subjectively determined. Sorneone is lovable if someone can love vou. But that kind of subiectivity makes it inpossible to assess love. All love wotrld be appropriate. Put aside the nature of beinS lovable. Perhaps it would be better to talk in terms of an overall assessrnent of the person. For love to be appropriate, the beloved sfrould be a good persor] overall. This is a bit more promisiog, but it is sti l l fails. For starters, what kind of good do we have in rnind? Will iust any do? Aesthetic? Is it appropriate to love a beautiful l)erson who is not so virtr.rous? Or does moral worth trump all? That's hard to believe. Apart from these questions, the celrtral problern with any attempt to evaluate love according to some kjnd synoptic evaluation of the beloved is that love isn't an evaluation. Nor does it seem to essentially involve any such evaluation. Love rides over and above our evaluations of the beloved. We can be crit icized for falsely evaluating people, but love is not an evaluation. Nevertheless, the relationship between love and evaluation is important. Consider someone wllo falls in love with Il i t ler, who somehow faked ll is death and managed to flee to South America:ra Argentina, 195O: Evita nret a strange looking Inan with a German accent at the market. Sl)e finds him oddly attractivc. As they get to know each othet she develops a nagging suspicioll that he is Adolph Hitler. After a few weeks, he confesses to having faked suicide and fled to South America when the Nazi cause looked ltoDeless. Evita decides not to turn him, as she thinks that she is fall ing in love. Considering this case, it seems that love is indeed sor etin)es prohibited. It certainly seems inappropriate to fall in love witlr Hitler. Remember, we are talking about Hitler! And if i t is inappropriate, there nrust be normative reasons against loving. This is certainly a worrisome problem for the no-reasons view. But ttre view is not without a plausible reply. An analogy rniSht help. The Is It ll(tk'r tu Lora' lJdtcr'fhittss? 1O.t French vitalist Herrri Bergson noted that hrrmorous arnusement requires a'momentaryaneslhesia of the heart' (Bergsolt 1956, p. 64). Simply put, it is hard to be amrrsed if one feels sorrv for the butt of a ioke. Sonletl l ing similar might be said for love, It is hard to love solneone you find repuIsive. Hitler is repulsive, rlot iust because of t l le stupid mustache, but because of what lre did. He's a moral rnonster. How could someone possibly love such a nran? IJow could one spend enough time with l l i l l for that to happen? In these obseryations, t lte no-reasons view finds a reply: it is not lhal love of I l i t ler is inappropriate, but that not f inding him repulsive shows a monstrous indifference to lrorrif ic evil.rs At worse love can be indirectly, cou nterfact ua l ly inappropriate. If F,vila had shown proPer repulsion to Hitler's crirnes, she would have likely found it psychologically impossible to fall in love witl) Hitler. This docs not show that Hitler is obiectively unlovable. Instead, it shows tl lat trre typical psycholoSical effect of moral repulsion is the blocking of love. The question this leaves us is whether it should ttock love. What would wc say of someone who found l-l i t ler repulsive but sti l l loved him? If it is incollerent to be botl l reDulsed and ilt love, then wc can say that lovc is indirectly inappropriate. The person sllould have been repulsed. Repulsion blocks love. Hence, the person shouldn't love Hitler. At least she shouldn't have fhllerr in love with Flit ler. But I don't see any reason to think that this combination of attitudcs in incoherent. Unusual, ycs. Incoherent, wlly? And if i t is coherent to botlt love someone and be repulsed by their character or actions, then tl lere is not much to say of someone who loves l l i t ler otl ler than that she ls very abnormal. 7 Conclusion As l noted in the ir)troduction, I have not provided a completely satisfactory answer to tl le question, ' ls it better to love bette. things?'The question is iust too ambiguous and too diff icult to tackle in a single essay. Even the more specific question,' ls it better to love better peopte?,' is hard to pin down. But I have provided sornc answers. I have argued tl lat love essentially involves carilrg for the beloved ltrr her own sake. This is clearly not a sufficienl description of love. Mosl plausibly, typical lorms of love also involve desires to associate witl l t l)e beloved and for t lte desire to be reciprocated.r('These desires migll l admit of rational assessrnent. If desires are tl le kil]d of things that can be iustif ied, it seenrs that reasons of self-interest, for instance, corrld justify a desire to associate witl l t l le beloved. But I don't think that these desires i 104 , ,1df t ) t Srxr ts cap lLr re w l ra t i s a t thc hcar t o l love . A t l lear t i s sc l f less co l l cc rn . l lence, I Iocus on t l r i s aspec t o f love . And t l r i s aspec t i s d i l fe re l r t f ro tn bo th lhe (lesire to associate witl l t lre beloved and tl lc desire lor reciprocatioll. l t 's d i f le ren t in tha t i t carno t be jus l i f ied by appea ls to va lucs suc l ) as se l f i l ] t c rcs l , t ru lh lu luess , o r lnean ing . Onc carno t care fo r t l l e l l c lovcd lo r l le r own sa l (c fo r t l l c sake o f t l )ese va lucs . T l ra t ' s inco l le rer t t . Ncverll leless, it does sccln betlcr', in terrl ls ol aPl)ropriatcncss (or l i t l i ngocss or np lDcss) , to love [ )e t te r pq ] l ) l c . A l l l l oug l l love is l lo t an asscssnre l r t , i t i s l yp ica l l y b lockec l I ry cer la i r k i r lds o f asscss t l l cn ts o l t l l e l )e loved. Wl rc l r wc don ' l unders ta r l ( j l l ow a I r ie r ( l car ) love a bor i t tS , i rnnrora l , ug ly loser , wc arc l )uzz le ( l a t l )ow l re fa i led to corne to l l re proper l rcga t ivc eva lua t ion o f l ) i s be lovcd, o r a t how l l le neSat ive va lu a t io r t d idn ' t b lock lovc . We expec t t l r i s to l lappen, thouSl l we k t low i t o l feD fa i l s . I considerecl an espcciit l ly clear case, I lvita's lovc of f l i t ler. Llere we want to say l l lat slle should not love Il i t ler rtot because he docstt 't dcserve to benefit fronl her concenr, blrl because slre slrttuld ltave l)een rcpo lsed. H i t le r i s l ) ideo t rs ly cv i l . I l so tneot te fa l l s fo r l J i t l c r dcsp i te the fac t tha t l r . ' i s I r ideous ly ev i l , thcy are l i ke ly ind i f le re r r t o h is c r imes. 'f lrat's not acceptable. lD so far as r oral disgust blocks love, love ol H i t le r i s i rd i rec t l y inappropr ia te . B l r t , as la r as I car ) te l l , lhe te i s t ro reason to th ink t l ra t d is l ius t oug l r t to b lock love . I t ius t te r tds to do so . I l l l i nk t l )a t ' s about a l l we ca say . Ar rd i t sccnrs l i ke enoug l l to capture our most i rnpor faDt i r ) tu i t io l lSl7 Notes I A silr i lrr lrglinrcrrt calr l)( 'ron in sul)poll ()l t lrc sutl)risinsly contr()\ 'ersial c l l in r l l ra l , ln i l l ra l \ can l ( )vc . ' lhcy a l \o g r icve l l l cko t l (2 (X)7) , pp .62 70 , lv l i l l i g ln (21) l1 ) , pp . 124 136, l t l ) \ ' l i rn (h (201:J ) , pp . l l 14 , i rnd Sr r ru ts ( r r ranuscl ipt) arSuc ir l supl)(nt {)f thc vicw lhirt animals ci ln ci lrc. 2. l lc lnr (z(X)c)), p. '+5. K() l(xlnv (2(X):J), l ) . l l t7, n.2 t()es s() f l r i rs to Llcny that cl l i ldren can lovc. :1. aircc'n ( l lx l7), pl). 2lO rnd 224 l)roushl fr icd chickcr] t() ot lr sytr l l )osit lnl . 4 . W( ) l l ( 20 lOh ) ,np . l 4 i nd lT ig r ccs .Ncwt r )nS I1 r i t l r ( l ( ) l l 9 ) , p .204pu tsc i r c i r t lhc t()p {)f thr c(nccpls analyt icir l ly [csrrpp()scd by thc trsc ()f ' l ()vc. ' 5. l( t l i rr)orc (2(X)()), l ) . 73 concurs. 6. lorr( 's (2{X)4), pf. : lJ: l 6 pft)vidcs a sirrr i lnr l ist. 7. ( ir i lu (200aj, 2010) ()f fcrs l l )c bcst acc()t lnt of irrcpl l(c:thi l i tV in thc l i teraturc. 8. I ' r in/ (20(),1) anLl lk)binson (2{)05) prrrvir lc i l l rpoftant, rccent cr i t ic isrns ol thc th{rny. I lci !h (1!194) arsucs thirt t l rc cosrr i t ivc thcorv inrplausi l ty inr l l ics that i lnimrls and l)al) ic\ d() n()t l rrv! tnr{)t ions. I iowlirr ld\ (2{}12), l) f . 40-70 l)r ' ()viclcs an cffcct ivc r 'cply to I)r ' igh. 9. Nailr (201.3) d(rfer)ds a disposit i()nrl htof,v. Is Il ltetter to Lov? Il?ttcr ThifiSs? l1s i0. Taylor (1975), pp.400 I notes the conncction, as do Stockcr (1996), p. 175, ( lrcc ( l997), pp.214 and 227 2, a]nt l {awls (1971), p.487. Solomon (1980), p. 276, argucs that ernotions are persooal and involvcd cvaluations. l 'aylor (1985), pp. 59-62, argucs that ernotions reveal what we valuc, what matters k) us. ' l 'hcy are imporFascript ions. Roherts (19tt8), pp. 188-9, claims that cmotions arc groundcd in concerns. Shoemakcr (2003), pp. 91-:1, argues lhat cmotiorls are conccptual ly connectcd k) carcs. I Ielm (2009a), pp. .5-6, notcs that emotions havc a focus, a locus of c()ncern. And Nussbaum (200:l) argues that orot ions are evaluations of personal importance. Strangclt in his comprehcnsivc and inf lucntial taxonomy of lhe obiects of cDrotions, De Sousa ( l999), ch. 5 lcavcs out the object of our concern. I Ie uscs ,focus, dif fercntly, k) rcfcr to thc focus of attcntion: thc snarl ing dog's rrcnacing t(reth I l . ' lhis leads Shaffer ( l98:l) , p. 170, k) cla irn that lovc is an 'anornalous cnlot ion., (;recn (1997), p. 214, thinks t l)at t l t is obscures thc problcm. IIe simply dcnit:J that lovc is a cnrol ion. 12. Tl l is rrhccl has bccn invented a fcw t iDcs: Cott ingham (1986) dcfends this l ine of argurlcnt. Witho t nrentioning Cott ingham; thc l iame stylc of arSU mcnt is relcatcd iD Wolf (1992), who dcfcnds thc c()ntrovcrsial claim t l)at part ial i ty sornctimcs trumps moral i ty And without mcntioning Wolf 's paper, ( locking and Kennctt (2000) reach roughly thc samc conclusi()n. 13. Oldcnqrf ist ( .19n2\, p. 176, ar 'gucs that since wc cart sacri f ice in thc narnc of l{)yalty, loyalt ies arc not sclf , inicrcsted. 14. leske (1997), p. 62, defends a no rcasons, or ' l )rute acc{}unt ' fr iendship. Shc (p. 69) considcrs whcther one sho|ld bcfr iend I l i t lcr. Mil l iSan (201 1), pp. 5 and 72, also discusses thc love of I l i t ler. 15.: irnuts (2007, 2(X)q, and 2013) develops an analogous l inc of argument conccrning moral i ty aDd amLtscment. 16 . ' l ' homas (1991 ) , ( l r een (1997 ) , p . 216 , and ' l hy l o r ( 1976 ) a l l emphas i zc t hcsc aspccls ()f rolnantic Iovc. 17. I than k Arin a l isrnen ny a nd Tonv Mil l igan for ht ' lpfu I fecdback on an carl ier vcrsion of this chaptcr Bibliography Ilekoff, M. (2007) Tltc E,notiott(rl Lives of,4/iirltdls (Novato: Ncw World Ljbrary). l lergson, I I . (1956) 'Laughter, ' i i Conkly, cd. Wylie Syphcr (Balt imore: Johns I Iopkins University l ' rcss),61 192. Ituss, S. & Overk)n, [,. (eds) (2(X)2) Conburs of Atrllcy (Canrbridgc, MA: MIT Itcss). (bckirrg, D. & Kcnnett, J. (2000) 'kiendship and Moral l) t ] lgct, 'Thc lounrol of I,hibsollh)t 97 (5), 278-96. Cott inshafr, l . ( I9l ]6) ' l ,art ial i ty, Invori t ism, and Mora l i tr ' P/r i l . rs olhi.al euit tct ly, : t6 (14,1),3.s7-73. l)c'So(sa, R. (1999) Th? Rntio|alitl ofthc f.t otkDls lc,anbridge, MA: MIl press). l)cigh, l . (1994) '( i )gnit ivis l in the' lhcory of Emotions, ' trhi.s, 104, 824-54. l :rankfirrt , l l . ( l !199) 'On ( laring, ' in Ncc?ssit)1, Vlt l i t ion, d,r.J love (Cambridge: ( r r r r b r i d l u ( ' n i \ r ' r : ' i t ) I ' r r ' \ \ r , I 55 8 ( r . (2(X)2)' l lc l ly to Susan Wolf, ' in Buss and ()vcrton (2{)02),245-52. l (J6 Aarott S?tufs (irau, ( lh. (2(X)6) ' l rrcplaccahil i ty nnd L,niquc Valur, ' Plt ih, i ' r l ) l1i&l Tt\) i t 's, :12 (11 i2 ) , 111 29 . - (2010 ) ' l . ovcand l l i s t o r y , ' . \ o r t . r , r , L ' u rna lo f1 ' l t i l t ] so f l t ] ' , 1aQ) ,24671 . lJclnr, B. (2(X)()) ' l ,ovc, Idcnti f icat ion, and thc l i rnotions, ' ADkr n Plt i losol l t i .nl Qunrt(r |y,46,39-59. lcskc, l) . (1997) ' fr icndship, Virtrrc, arrd Inrpart ial i ty, ' I ' l t i losol l tr dt l I '1rctf t) t , t(nolosiarl R(&tft l t , 57 ( lJ,5t 72. . lol l i rn ore, ' l ' . (2(X)0) ' Ir icndslr i t)s wi lh()ut I)rr l ial i ly?, ' ldr/r ' r) , l . l (1), a,c)l t2Joncs , K . ( 2004 ) ' l ) n { ) l i ona l l i r l i r ) n i r l i t y i s I ' r ac t i c i l i a t i on l l i t y , ' i n ( : h . ( l l l hoL r r r (r 'd.)S(tt iDS t l t( Mudl( jrrr lr i r j l r tssd),\ t l l l r ntt 1' l t i lo\of lk ' tr (Ncrr Y()rk: ()xir)rd Urrivcrsi ly l l css). K{) l{)dnv, N. (2o0:l) ' l .ove as Vir luing a l tcl i r l i ()nship, ' / ' t i l r)J(\) l t i i t l l l (vi t n' , 112 12), 1:|5,u9. f.( |clct ir ls (2(X)7) TI.( 'NnturL of fhi,rys ( l .ord(n): I 'cr j tuirr). l v l i l l i gan , l - . ( 20 l l ) Lov ( ( l ) u r l r i l l n , N ( l : Acun rcn ) . Naar, l l . (20l:3) 'A I) is|osit ioni l lhco,y (t I-()\ 'L ' , ' I \ t( i l i ( l ' l t i l t )sol)1t i .dl ( luatt( l ! ' , 94 (: . |) , :142-s7. Ncwton-Smith, W. (1989)'A ( irrccptual lnvcstigntioo (rf l ,()vc, ' i ' r Sr)bl( ' ( l ()89). Nussbaurn, M. (2(X)3) ' l ' .nr()t i ()ns as.lud8nrclr ls of Vrluc antl Inr l)()r lancc, ' iD l{ . Sofomon (cd.) WhaI 1s at i l . , tk) l iott? (Ncw Vt k: ()xl in'd t lrr ivclsi ty l)rcss). () ldL'nquisl, A. (1982)' l ,oyalt ics, 'Tr( l t ,u, ' tal of Phikt,nt l lh! ' ,79 (4), 17:l-9:1. l ' r inz,. i . (2004) (;rt R.n.t i t) t ls: A lu.t ' l t tunl Thlty ol Enlol i t)u (Ncr,, , York: ()xl(nd l lnivcfsitv l)rcss). Ik)berts, Ft. (1. (198{l) 'Wlrrt nrr l lmoti()n Is: A Skctclr, 'TltL' I ' l t i l t )sol l t iel l R(t ' i , \ \ ' , xcv[ (2), 183 2Oe. llobinson,.J. (20(15) l)c?11?r lltd,t ll.rdson: l)|otit t o tl iI\ llol( iu Lik\tt r.', Mu\i, d/rr lA, l (()xfold: ()x1(nd Univcr\ i ty l)rcss). I lowlands, M. (2012) Colt Ani i dls l i { ,Moftr l i ' (()xfofd: ()xl{)rd lJrr ivcr\ i ty l) fcss). Shocnr a ker, D- (2(X): l) ' ( lar ing, ldcnt i f ic ir t ion, Agcnc)' , ' Ctr i .s, I I 4, {Jl} I 1 t l . Shaffcr,. f . (1gu:l) 'An Assessnrcnt of l i .motion, ' Annfidtn l ' l t i lo\ofhit t l l Quli t( t l l1, 2 { ) ( 2 ) , 161 -7 .1 . Shand, A. (1914) TIt( Fo nlnt i t) t15 of(:1,dftr. tu'r ( l ,rnrdlnr: M;rcMil lr t ] ,r ' r( l ( l () .) . Sinscr, L (196ai) Th. Nnfurc ol l ,oN( I ' l rr lo k) 1-r l l r . / ' (Nc$r Yofk: l i , l l )d,, fr I l ( ' rsc). l i r r r ! t s , A . ( 2OO7) ' l hc . l okc i s t hc l h i n j . j : " l n t h r ( i ) r r pnny o l Mcn i r r r | l l l r ( l l t h i cs <rf l l lnno(, ' Fi l tn and Phihsofl t) ' , 11,4<) 66. (2009) 'Do M()ral f laws lr. i rhancc Arnuserncir l l , ' ADk'r i .on l) l t i la\\ thnL (trn rlcrly, 46 (2'), 1 5 1 -6:4. - ( 2013 ) ' ' l h c Sa t i r i ca l nnd t hc Sa l i r c i ( ) r r s : I r t l ) c i cnsc r ) f Syo r r r l c t r i ( ( ) ) r r i ( Moftlinn,' Jo nlal ol-A.sthclt Elut:otit)n, 47 (,1), 45-63. onanuscript) Fiv( Tlk's(s dboltt ()tr ing ( l{ctr icvcd lr(nn htt l)r / / l t r i lpapcrs. orglrec/liMUIr'l'A). Sohlc, A. (cd.) (1989) g/.)s, A,qd/r i ntkl Phi l i i : Rt 'dl i t !3s i l fht ' l ' l t i l t )so1ltr ol l .ot\ ' (sl . I 'aul, MN: I 'arag(n I I()Lrsc). Solonlo|, l l . (1980) ' l }n()t ions and ( lhoice, ' i i r l {o[ l ,v A. (ed.) (1980) / jxl l r tr tr ! I trToaidrs ([ .os Angeles: Univcrsity ()f ( i i l l i foir) in l ]css). - & l( l l iggins, K. (cds) (1e91) Th. Plt ikrsol, l t l , ol (Etot iO Lt)r? ( l . lwrcncc: Unjvcrsity Prcss of Kansns). ' laylor, Cl). ( l9tt5) 'Sclflnterl)rct ins Animals, ' i1 Hut n,t Aloky o l Latlgun!( (( lan)bridgc: ( larnbriclSc Lftr ivcrsity Irrcss). It It lt.ltt'r to Lov( Il<!tt( Tltinss? 1(17 '1aylor, ( i . (197.5) ' 'ust i fying thc f,moti()ns, ' Mird, 84 (: l :r5), : . tc.X) 402. - (1976) 'l.t)vc,' Prod'tii gs of th( Ari\lt)lclit,1 So.i(ty, 76, 147-64. ' l ho,nas, L. (1991) ' l {casons for l ,oving, ' in Solornon and I I igSins ( l99l ), 467-76Wolf, : i . (1992) 'Mori l i ly and Pnrt ial i t) ' , ' / )r i lo r) l /r i (d/ / l ,rsr( f iv..r , 6, 2,1:.t- .59. - (2(l02l 'Thc ' l ' rrc, thc ( iood, rnd thc Lovahlc: l i .ankf(rrt ,s Avoidancc of ()bicct ivi t) , , ' in l lus\ ancl Overl(}n \2(X)Z).227 41. - (20l0a) Mcnni,t ! i , t Li l1, n l Wlt), i f Mrrt i{ , , :r ( l l incekn, Nl: l }r incck)n Univcrsitv l ' f r 'ss). (2010b) ' l .ovc: lhc tJirsic ( luestions, ' I )utt t r l l l , . . l rrr. (h{t l : / /w\\ ' \ i r .pt)k. org/home/|o. lrsNcws.aspx?id=38:t) l f r . , r ' r r ' t , t t , l l l l . ( , , , , | l t t \ t r t \ n t \ t t { t t , t \ l . ! | l l o } t l \ l l | | l \ r r l r l l r l t \ ( | I ' r n r \ r , l t | \ t i l i c r l i on a |d t hc Law (2013 ) I \ l I r l l l l r Love and Its Obiects What Can We Care For? Edited by Christian Maurer Univefiity ofFrilrourg, S litze a d Tony Milligan U iversiq) ofHettfordshie, United Kitlgdon and Kamila Pacovsk6 Utlivelsity of Paftluhice, Czcch R?public palQrav0 macnni[[an )o t.